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Introduction
Price discounts are pervasive in the business world. At the retailing 
level, various forms of price reductions exist for various reasons. 
This paper focuses on a particular form of price discounts, namely a 
periodic price reduction that consists of long periods of a constant 
(high) price and short periods of a discounted (low) price. This kind of 
intertemporal pricing is typical in the fast food and service industries. 
For a time in Durham, North Carolina, all Burger King Customers 
could enjoy burgers at $0.99 a piece on Wednesdays, while the normal 
price was $2.99. More interestingly, during that same time, Wendy’s 
also offered its price discounts every Wednesday. Another example is 
the discount price of HK $40 that all movie theatres in Hong Kong 
simultaneously charge on Tuesdays, vis-a-vis a regular ticket price of 
HK $60 on any other days. Free admission is available each Wednesday 
in all public museums in Hong Kong1. In many European countries, 
public transportation is free on particular days each year. Similar 
pricing patterns exist for durable goods. Figure 1 shows the daily price 
time path of color TVs at Sears, San Diego [1].
Existing literature has several explanations for why price discounts 
are offered. Some models focus on spatial price dispersion, while 
some others study price variations over time. Spatial price dispersion 
cannot persist unless there is market friction, otherwise a store 
charging a higher price than its competitors would not have any sales. 
Market friction, in the form of consumer searching costs or switching 
costs, typically leads to mixed strategy equilibria, which generates 
intertemporal price variation for any given store [2-4]. The variation, 
however, does not display any regularity. Price discounts on selected 
items may serve the purpose of generating store traffic. The familiar 
marketing tactic of the “loss leader” or the “bait and switch” strategy is 
meant to use the low price of one good to lure consumers into buying 
the complements [5,6] or substitutes [7] for that good. However, fast 
food restaurants and movie cinemas are both highly specialized stores 
that would find it difficult to offer a great variety of complements and 
substitutes.
More relevant to this paper are models with a clear time dimension. 
Lazear [8] suggests that in the presence of demand uncertainty, a good 
strategy is to start with a high price and eventually lower the price if 
the item has not been sold. While Lazear’s model explains well the 
“clearance sale” of fashion clothing, for which demand uncertainty 
plays a central role, it is hardly applicable to generic goods such as fast 
foods, for which demand is relatively predictable. Besides, an auction-
type downward pricing is quite different from a cyclic price movement. 
Intertemporal price discrimination could happen when consumers 
have differential costs for holding inventories2, which makes periodic 
price discounts optimal [9,10].
But, obviously, people do not buy large amounts of fast food to save 
for future consumption. Fast food, like services, is not storable. Finally, 
price discounts could be a store’s optimal response to a changing 
demand or cost. In Conlisk et al. [11], Sobel [12], and Pesendorfer [13], 
a new cohort of consumers enters the market each period so that cyclic 
pricing is optimal for the firms. These models are mainly suitable for 
durable goods: Once a consumer buys the good, she vanishes forever 
from the market; if a consumer does not buy at some time, she stays 
in the market until the next sale. Clearly, fast foods are not durable. It 
is also hard to believe there are new customers who enter the market 
every day.
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Abstract
In this paper, I offer a new theory for why price reductions take place on a regular basis in some industries. I suggest 
that the demand for a firm’s product drops over time because of the erosion of consumers’ brand recall, and that price 
discounts are utilized to boost the diminishing demand. A dynamic model is then constructed to demonstrate the theory 
for both monopoly and duopoly competition. I show that it is optimal for a monopolist to alternate between a constant 
high (normal) price and a constant low (discount) price with fixed frequency, and that competing firms offer discounts 
at the same time in duopoly competition.
Periodic Price Reduction as a Way to Boost Diminishing Demand
Wen Zhou*
School of Business, the University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
1Weekly discounts seem to be most common, but other frequencies exist. A mu-
seum in Los Angeles, California, lets people in free of charge on the first Tuesday 
of each month.
2Here the discrimination takes the form of inventory shifting. Another possible sce-
nario is to use inter temporal price variation to sort consumers with differential 
valuations of the product. But, as pointed out by Stokey [14] and Varian [15], this 
practice is in general not profitable.
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Figure 1: Daily price time path of color TVs at Sears, San Diego [1].
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In this paper, I am interested in the regular intertemporal price 
movement of a non-durable, non-storable good exemplified by fast 
food and other industries. There is clearly a cycle: a store charges a 
constant regular price most of the time, and a constant discounted price 
every now and then. The timing of discounts is fixed and predictable, 
and the pricing pattern exists in both monopoly and oligopoly, with 
all stores offering discounts at the same time3. In this paper, I offer a 
new theory for why price reductions take place on a regular basis. A 
dynamic model is then constructed to show that the pricing pattern 
observed in reality is indeed optimal for the firms.
When people think of periodic price reductions such as those by 
Burger King and Wendy’s on Wednesdays, the first response might 
be “peak-load pricing” such as the “Happy Hours” studied by Varian 
[15], the seasonal price variation described by Gerstner [16], or the 
well-known pricing pattern for electricity, car rentals, telephone calls, 
etc. in which fixed capacity plays an important role. Presumably, the 
mid-week demand for dining (or movie) services is smaller than that 
during weekends, which justifies differential and cyclic prices. It is then 
optimal for a monopolist to charge a low price in the mid-week when 
demand is low. But, then, why does the price reduction not appear on 
Tuesdays or Thursdays? It is hard to believe that the demand stays the 
same for six days of the week, and then sharply drops on Wednesdays, 
as implied by a discount price of $0.99 versus a normal price of $2.99. 
A more fundamental problem with this explanation, though, is the 
requirement of market power. When there is competition, peak-load 
pricing is simply not sustainable. In fact, Warner and Barsky [17] 
document strong empirical evidence of lower prices when demand is 
higher, for example, during weekends and holidays.
Another plausible explanation for periodic price reduction is 
intertemporal price discrimination–high valuation consumer’s 
purchase on the spot, while price-sensitive customers wait until the 
price is lowered4. In order for them to make intertemporal choices, 
however, consumers need to have unit demand each week, not every 
day. While this might be true for movies and video tape rentals, it is 
hardly the case with fast food or mass transportation, for which people 
make daily purchases. One more problem with the price discrimination 
theory is that it cannot explain why the seller offers the good for free (e.g. 
museums and European mass transportation). Price discrimination is 
meant to raise profits. A zero price is obviously not optimal if price 
discrimination is the only purpose: the seller would have been better 
off closing the business on that day rather than offering the product or 
service for free.
In summary, I believe the existing literature is not able to explain 
fully the price cycles in the fast food and other industries. I attempt 
to give a new explanation for the phenomenon in this paper. My 
argument consists of two major points. First, without any stimulation, 
the demand for a particular product diminishes over time, as 
consumers eventually forget about this product. A person might not 
remember the good taste of a Big Mac if there is nothing to remind her, 
so she just brings her lunch from home. In fact, a declining demand is 
one of the major reasons behind the need for continuous and endless 
advertising. Why does Nike repeatedly promote itself? Why because 
otherwise people will go away. A new product may need advertising 
to inform people of its existence and of the function of the product, or 
to signal its quality [18], but for well-established brand names such as 
McDonald’s, Nike or Intel, persistent advertising campaigns can only 
be explained by one purpose: keeping consumers hooked. Without 
any reminder, a firm’s consumer base will gradually erode away. The 
second point of my argument is that periodic price discounts can be 
used to boost diminishing demands. A price reduction will certainly 
lead to a higher quantity demanded in the current period. But a 
higher current consumption implies a higher demand in the future. 
This positive relationship has been well established in the habit 
persistence literature [21-24]. If a consumer’s utility is a function of 
past consumption as well as current consumption, then the marginal 
utility of current consumption, and hence the demand function, would 
be increasing in past consumption. Blattberg and Neslin [25] point out: 
“... any purchase of a brand has implications beyond the immediate 
purchase occasion: The consumer forms a habit toward purchasing 
the brand, sustains that habit, or learns about the performance of the 
brand”. Slade [26] expresses a similar idea in her empirical formulation 
of price changes. The demand function in her model contains a term 
for consumer goodwill, which erodes over time and reacts positively 
to price cuts.
Given the basic idea of a shrinking demand and the possibility for 
a firm to use price discounts to boost the demand, I study the optimal 
and equilibrium choice of price discounts under both monopoly and 
duopoly settings. In the model, firms have a large set of choice variables 
at their disposal: the normal and discount prices as well as the duration, 
frequency, and timing of discounts. I find that it is indeed optimal for 
firms to offer a constant normal (high) price most of the time, and a 
constant discounted (low) price occasionally with the same frequency. 
In duopoly equilibrium, each firm seeks the longest lasting effect of 
its boosted demand before the demand is eroded by its rival’s next 
discount. As a result, in equilibrium, the two firms offer discounts at 
the same time. 
It has been well established in consumer psychology [27] and 
social psychology [28] literature that consumers’ memory declines 
over time and the memory can be stimulated by sales promotions such 
as price discounts. For example, Wyer’s [27] Principle 2 states that 
“The accessibility of a unit of knowledge in memory is an increasing 
function of both the recency with which it has been activated and 
the frequency with which it has been activated. The effect of recency 
decreases over time.” Adaval and Monroe [29] demonstrated the 
relation between knowledge accessibility and pricing. Nedungadi [30] 
found that changes in a brand’s accessibility may affect the probability 
that it is retrieved and considered for choice. Alba and Chattopadhyay 
[31] demonstrated that consumers have difficulties recalling brands 
(brand inhibition), and that exposure to promotion activities induces 
positive responses from consumers. “Frequent or recent exposure to a 
brand increases its salience (i.e., the prominence or ‘level of activation’ 
of a brand in memory), thereby increasing the ability of a consumer to 
recall it. Marketing variables that enhance the salience of a brand have 
been shown to be related directly to recall.” 
Banerjee [32,33] presented two models to explain how people are 
influenced by others’ opinions. Behavioral learning theory suggests 
that rewarded behavior tend to persist [34,35]. Promotions such 
as price discounts can serve as such a reward, thereby increasing 
subsequent purchases. Boulding et al. [36], Mela et al. [37], Papatla and 
Krishnamurthi [38], Shankar and Krishnamurthi [39] all found that 
promotion purchasing changes price sensitivity. Gedenk and Neslin 
[40] demonstrated that promotion had long-term effects on consumer 
3Doyle [19] claims that “most stores seem to hold sales simultaneously”.
4A slightly different story is offered by Villas-Boas [20]: Consumers live for two periods. A monopolist firm price discriminates against consumers who have bought in the 
previous period. Cyclical pricing occurs in equilibrium.
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behavior. Price promotions have been demonstrated to be profitable 
in the long run [41,42]. Sellers usually employ two types of promotion 
tactics [43]: A flat, low price (everyday low pricing), and an alternation 
between a relatively high price and frequent price discounts (hi-lo 
pricing). Tsiros and Hardesty [44] have suggested a new discounting 
strategy, which requires a seller to return the discounted price to 
the regular level in several steps rather than at once. They argue that 
consumers will be tricked into purchasing more because they observe 
an upward time trend of the price and may conclude that the price will 
keep rising. To the extent that word of mouth (WOM) or consumer and 
professional reviews help establish a positive relation between present 
consumption and future consumption, these channels are consistent 
with the theory presented here. I have mainly used the habit persistence 
theory to explain the positive relation, but WOM and reviews will lead 
to the same prediction. Of course WOM and reviews will mainly affect 
the consumption choice by potential buyers rather than existing buyers, 
but at the aggregate level they would still lead to a positive relation. 
Marketing scholars have long established the importance of WOM and 
reviews. The advance of the internet has made it much easier to collect 
and quantify such information [45-51]. Many firms regard online 
consumer reviews as an important marketing tool [52]. They regularly 
post product information and sponsor promotional chats on online 
forums [53], and may even manipulate online reviews [54].
The paper is organized as follows. The basic monopoly model is 
set up in Section 2. The next three sections study the optimal choice of 
the normal price and the depths and frequency of discounts. Section 
6 extends the basic model to duopoly competition and derives the 
equilibrium timing of discounts. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model: Monopoly
Time is discrete with an infinite horizon. A time unit is called a 
period. Consider a monopolist who sells a standard product in each 
period. Consumers are distributed uniformly with density 1 along a 
straight line, one end of which is occupied by the monopolist firm. In 
each period, every consumer demands at most one unit of the product. 
Consumers’ willingness to pay is μ, and the unit transportation cost in 
period t is (1/xt) for all consumers. In period t, the marginal consumer, 
who is in different between buying and not buying, is therefore 
characterized by µ-pt-(1/xt)ωt = 0, where pt is the price in that period 
and ωt is the distance between the consumer and the firm. This equation 
leads to ωt = xt (µ- pt). A consumer buys from the firm if and only if he 
is located between the firm and the marginal consumer. As a result, the 
quantity demanded for the monopolist in period t, qt is represented by 
the marginal consumer’s location in that period: qt = ωt (recall that the 
distribution density is 1). That is, the demand function for the firm in 
period t is qt =  xt (µ-pt).
The unit transportation cost, 1/xt, represents the difficulty 
consumers have in remembering the product. An obscured memory 
means a higher transportation cost, or, equivalently, a lower xt. In 
a way, xt can be interpreted as the stock of consumer memory or 
goodwill. As argued before, this memory should erode over time and 
respond positively to price cuts. More specifically,
Assumption 1
The consumer memory, xt, changes in the following way: given xt−1 
in the previous period and the depth of the price discount, dt, in the 
current period, 
xt = δxt−1 + λdt,                        (1) 
Where 0 < δ < 1, λ > 0 the depth of the discount, dt, is defined as 
dt = max{rt − pt, 0},
Where pt is the actual price charged in period t and rt is the reference 
price for that period.
Assumption 1 describes the transition of consumer memory 
between two consecutive periods. The memory erodes at a fixed rate, δ, 
and can be boosted by λ for every dollar of price cuts5. For simplicity, 
the effect of price discounts on xt is assumed to be linear and is separable 
from that of xt−1. This assumption can be relaxed without changing the 
basic features of the model6.
The monopolist is said to offer a price discount in period t if the 
actual price, pt, is strictly lower than the reference price, rt. Otherwise, 
the price is normal (pt ≥ rt). The depth of the discount, dt, is defined to 
be the difference between rt and pt. When the firm charges the normal 
price, dt = 07.
Assumption 2
The reference price in period t is 
rt = min{pr, pt−1}, 
where pr is the long-term regular price, which is obtained by taking the 
average of normal prices over a long time span.
Consumers determine their reference price in period t, rt, as the 
lower value between the price in the previous period, pt−1, and the long-
term regular price, pr. They will not be fooled by two possible tricks 
used by the firm. On the one hand, there is a general regular price, pr. 
The firm is not able to cheat by raising pt−1, charging a pt that is lower 
than pt−1, and then claiming that it is having a “discount” in period 
t. On the other hand, consumers have fresh memory about the price 
in the previous period. They do not think any price that is lower than 
the regular price is always a discount8. The demand is not stimulated if 
today’s price is higher than or equal to yesterday’s price, even if both are 
lower than the regular price. In other words, a lower price is thought 
to constitute a discount only when it is lower than both the long-term 
regular price, pr, and the last period price, pt−1.
Consumers take the average of “normal” prices to form the long-
term regular price, pr. It should be emphasized that the average is taken 
over non-discount prices, not the price in every period. For example, 
$2.99 is both the long-term regular price of a burger and the “normal” 
price that is charged each day except Wednesdays. Consumers have a 
5The fixed percentage drop in memory should be more realistic than a fixed absolute drop: xt = xt−1 − δ + λdt, where there is nothing to prevent the memory stock from 
dropping below zero.
6A more general specification is to let xt asymptotically approach a certain level, say, x0. That is, xt = x0 + [δ(xt−1 − x0) + λdt] with xt ≥ x0 for every t. The model presented in 
this paper is a special case where x0 = 0.
7That is to say, the effect of price changes on the position of the demand function is asymmetric: a price reduction shifts out the demand curve, while a price rise does not 
have the opposite effect. This is because people have clear perceptions about normal and discount prices: a two dollar price cut is welcomed by everybody, while moving 
back to $2.99 is interpreted as only “returning to the normal price.”
8This can also be understood from the angle of reputation. As part of brand equity, reputation may be adversely affected by price discounts because low prices may deliver 
the image of low quality [55].
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clear understanding that $0.99 is a discount price and should not be 
included when they determine the long-term regular price9. 
Finally, the firm is assumed to have a constant marginal production 
cost, c ∈ (0, μ); a fixed cost, F, in the discount period (the cost of, say, 
advertising and changing price tags); and a time discount factor, β ∈ 
(0, 1). The monopolist chooses the price in each period to maximize the 
total present value of profit.
Normal Prices and Long-Term Regular Price
We first determine the optimal choice of normal prices. A normal 
price, pt, (i.e., no discount is offered in this period) affects the firm’s 
objective function directly and indirectly. The direct effect is on the 
current-period profit, while the indirect effect is on the next-period 
profit through the formation of the reference price10. The profit of 
period t is πt = qt(pt-c) = xt(μ −pt)(pt -c). Since dt = 0, the coefficient xt 
= δxt−1+λdt = δxt−1 is not affected by the choice of pt. Then, the single-
period profit, πt, is maximized at the monopoly price, pm = (μ+c)/2, 
which does not depend on the time index, t. Therefore, although the 
demand changes over time, the change is in such a way that the single 
period profit is maximized at the same price. When prices deviate from 
this optimal level, πt monotonically increases in pt when pt < pm and 
monotonically decreases in pt when pt > pm.
For the indirect effect, because rt+1 = min{pr, pt}, the current price 
pt, can become the reference price for the next period. This is relevant 
only when a discount is offered in t + 1. We can show that the indirect 
effect does not distort normal prices from pm.
Therefore,
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, every normal price is the same, and 
they all equal pm = (μ + c)/2. Consequently, the long-term regular price 
is pr = pm = (μ + c)/2. 
The driving force behind the uniform pricing in normal periods 
is that the single period monopoly price is the same despite changing 
demand coefficients. One may think that a uniform normal price that 
is slightly higher than pm should be beneficial to the firm, as a higher 
reference price means a smaller distortion in the discounted periods. 
This is not true, because when there are two consecutive normal 
periods, the optimal price for the first period should be pm, as it does 
not have any direct or indirect effect on the next period profit. 
Proposition 1 greatly simplifies the firm’s choice: When it is not 
offering any discount, the firm should always charge the same normal 
price. Nevertheless, the firm still faces complicated choices: the 
duration of discounts (i.e., whether or not it wants several consecutive 
discounts), the depth of every discount, and the frequency of discounts.
Depth of Discount 
For a wide range of parameter values, it can be shown that the firm 
should choose at most one discount period between any two  must be 
lower than the preceding price in order to constitute a discount. If the 
preceding price is already discounted, offering a further discount in the 
next period would be more costly, as the price would be farther away 
from the single-period-profit-maximizing price. Most of the time, the 
firm would rather wait for at least one period after a discount before 
the next is offered. 
In principle, the firm has the freedom of never offering any 
discounts, but in most cases this is not optimal12. Basically, the cost 
of offering a discount includes the fixed cost, F, and a lower current 
profit, while the benefit is higher demands in the future. If, the firm 
never offers any discount, the demand would eventually drop to zero, 
in which case offering discounts at least once is beneficial, given that 
the fixed cost, F, is not prohibitively high.
x(d)
x1
g
g
1
2
=
=
x2
x3
x g(d)
d
dd d1                   2
g(d)
x(d)
x
d dm
d
Case 1: g' (d ) < 0m
Case 2: g' (d ) > 0m
Figure 2: The dynamic transition of the demand coefficient.
9Blattberg and Neslin [25] present empirical findings on how the long-term regular price is formed: if the current price differs substantially from the normal price, then the 
observed price will be seen as “exceptional” and the regular price will not be updated. “This essentially tells the consumers that the reduced price is temporary and should 
not be used to decrease the consumers reference price” (p.46). I should point out that the “reference price” in Blattberg and Neslin [25] is in fact the “long-term regular 
price” in this paper.
10In principle, there could be a third effect: the firm’s profit may be affected by normal prices through a change in the long-term regular price, pr, which is the average of 
normal prices. The average, however, is taken over a long time span, so the impact of a single normal price on pr is negligible.
11The sufficient condition is that z or F is large enough, where z = (μ − c)/2, or that both δ and β are close enough to 1.
12The necessary condition for never offering any discount is F > (λβδz3)/(1 − βδ).
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It now becomes clear that the firm’s optimal strategy is to offer price 
discounts once at a time: a price discount for one period, then a normal 
price for several periods, followed by another discount for one period, 
and several other normal periods, and so on and so forth. I call the 
price movement from one discount period to the next a cycle. Consider 
the case when exactly n periods form a cycle. The firm chooses n first, 
commits to it, and then chooses the depth of the discount in each cycle. 
In what follows, I will determine the optimal depth of the discount 
for any given n, discuss the stability of the system, and finally find 
the optimal n. Making n a parameter first and then a choice variable 
implies that the discounts must be offered at equal pace13. 
A cycle starts with (n − 1) periods of normal prices and ends with a 
discount price, after which a new cycle starts. Suppose that the demand 
coefficient is x when a cycle starts, and that the depth of the discount 
is d. Then, xt = δt−1x for t = 1, 2, ··· , n – 1 and xn = δn−1x + λd. By 
Proposition 1, for t = 1, 2, ···, n − 1, pt = pm. The present value of profit 
is thus πt = xt(μ − pt)(pt − c) = δt−1xz2, where z = (μ − c)/2 is the profit 
margin when pm is charged. In the last period, pn = pm − d, which means 
that πn = xn(μ − pn)(pn − c) − F = (δn−1x + λd)(z2 − d2) − F. The total 
present value of the profits in the cycle is: 
( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 2
1
,π β π β λ δ− − −
=
 = = + − − − ∑
n
t n n
t
t
x d xy d z d xd F  (2)
Where ( )
2 1
0
1
β δ
βδ
−
= >
−
n nz
y  at the beginning of the next cycle, 
xn+1 = δxn = δnx + δλd.
Optimal depth of discount
Starting from an arbitrary x, the monopolist chooses a series of 
d in each cycle in order to maximize lifetime profits. This is a typical 
dynamic programming problem. In each cycle, there is a state variable, 
xi, and a choice variable, di. The time subscript has been changed from t 
to i, as the index is now about cycles (each consisting of n periods), not 
periods. The transition equation is 
xi+1 = δnxi + δλdi.
In line with standard procedures (see, for example, Stokey and 
Lucas, 1989) [56], define the value function as V (x). Then the value 
function satisfies the following Bellman equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0max ,π β δ δλ< <= + +d pm n nV x x d V x d                 (3)
Where the profit of the current cycle, π, is given by equation (2). A 
unique optimal choice, d > 0, is found for any given initial demand, x:
Proposition 2: The optimal choice of discount, d, is given by:
(i)   ( )
2 2 2
* 2 2 2/
φ φ λ ϕ
ϕλ φ
λϕ
− −
= = >
x x y
d d if x y
(ii) ( )2 2 2/2
µ ϕλ φ+= = <m
cd p if x y , where
( )1 2 21 0, 2 2 3φ δ β δ ϕ β δ β δ−= − > = + −n n n n n n n               (4)
A discount brings the following tradeoff: a positive d deviates 
from pm, reducing the profit in the current period; but it also boosts 
consumers’ brand recall, increasing the demand in the future. At d = 0, 
the first effect is zero, so the second effect dominates.
Therefore, unless λ = 0, the discount, d, should always be positive: 
the firm should always offer discounts.
It is easy to verify the following comparative static properties:
* * * * *
0, 0, 0, 0, 0
λ δ β
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
< > > > >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
d d d d d
x z
These signs all make intuitive sense: the discount should be deeper 
when the current business is not very good, a normal price brings more 
profit, consumers are more sensitive to price discounts, the decline in 
consumer goodwill is slower, or the firm is more patient.
Stability of the dynamic system
Proposition 2 determines the optimal depth of discounts. For any 
given x, there is a corresponding optimal choice, d*(x). Then, given d*, 
at the beginning of the next cycle, the firm faces a new demand, g = δnx 
+ δλd*(x), and needs to make another choice of d. We are interested 
in the stability of the dynamic system, namely whether or not such 
choices of d* will eventually lead to any steady state. It will make no 
sense to talk about price discounts if the system explodes.
The stability of the dynamic system can be studied in the following 
way14. Express both x and g as functions of the optimal discount, d*. It 
can be shown that the two functions have a unique intersection, which, 
by definition, is the steady state. Both functions are decreasing in d* at 
the intersection, and x is always steeper than g. Moreover, x decreases in 
d* over the entire range, while g can be either monotonically decreasing 
in d* (case 1 in Figure 2, where dm is the largest value that d* can take) 
or U-shaped (case 2 in Figure 2). Thus, the transition from x to g is 
determined by using d* as a linkage. In either case, it is obvious from 
Figure 2 that starting from any x, the system converges monotonically 
toward the steady state. Therefore, we have
Table 1: Time paths of demands and discounts under monopoly.
x 100 74.69 56.47 43.54 34.57 28.53 24.59 22.12 20.60 19.69
d 1.24 1.65 2.14 2.70 3.28 3.81 4.25 4.57 4.79 4.93
x 0 9.72 13.77 15.83 16.95 17.58 17.94 18.14 18.26 18.32
d 10.24 6.97 6.01 5.60 5.39 5.28 5.22 5.18 5.16 5.15
Table 2: Comparative statics in the steady state.
d x
z + + +
λ 0 + +
13There are two justifications for this implication. First, there may exist some natural choices of n, e.g. once a week. Once every other week or twice a week will be too 
confusing for consumers to remember. Second, the firm may need to announce and commit to the frequency of discounts. Presumably, prices can change much quicker 
than the frequency of discounts. The model regards price as a short-term variable and frequency as a long-term one.
14According to standard mathematics textbooks, the dynamic system is stable if and only if the eigenvalue of g(x) = δnx + δλd*(x) is less than 1 in absolute value. However, 
d* as a function of x is very complicated, making it impossible to find the eigenvalue of g(x).
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Proposition 3: The dynamic system (3) is globally stable: Starting 
from any x, the system converges monotonically to a unique steady 
state in which
( ), 11
γλδ γ δ
δ
= = = = −
−
n
nx x z d d z
and  ( )( )
1 0
1 3 2
β δγ
βδ δ β δ
−
= >
− − −
n n
n n n
To give an idea of how the system evolves a numerical example is 
constructed as follows. Let λ = 1, z = 5, δ = β = 0.95, n = 6. Then, the 
steady state is given by x = 18.41, d = 5.13. Starting from any x that 
is either above or below x , the system, described by the state variable 
x and the choice variable d, converges quickly and monotonically 
towards the steady state (Table 1).
The steady states of x and d are given in Proposition 3. By plugging 
them into equation (2), we can determine the profit of one cycle in the 
steady state. To simplify, assume β = δ. Let s = βn = δn, then,
( )( )2
1
1 3 21
λδ
δ
+
=
− +−
z sx
s s , 
2
2
1
3 21 δ
−
=
+−
z sd
s
,
and the profit of one cycle in the steady state is:
( )
( )( )
( )
53
332
1 12
3 21
λπ
δδ δ
− +
= −
+−
s sz s F
s
By direct observation, it is easy to verify the comparative statics in 
Table 2.
λ indicates the effectiveness of a discount on the demand. Previous 
discussion has shown that, for fixed x, d* increases in λ. However, when 
d increases, the demand coefficient of the next cycle increases so that d 
of the next cycle should be lower. The net effect happens to be that the 
steady state, d , does not depend on λ15.
Frequency of Discounts
Having analyzed the optimal choice of the discount in each cycle 
and the dynamics of the system for fixed n, I now turn to the optimal 
choice of n, which represents the frequency of discounts. In the steady 
state, the present value of lifetime profits is
( )( )
1
π
β
∏ =
− n
nn
Because β = δ and s = βn = δn, the profit becomes a function of s:
Proposition 4: The optimal n* is found as follows: for 
( )
3
321
λ
δ
=
−
zG
(i) when F > 0.385G, n* is infinite (i.e., the firm should never offer 
any discount);
(ii) when Gu(δ2) ≤ F ≤ 0.385G, an interior n* is found at 
*
* ln ,
lnδ
=
sn
, where
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
3
2
5
1 1
6
3 2
+ −
= −
+
s s
u s s
s
 and s* satisfies F = Gu(s*)
(iii) when F < Gu(δ2), n* = 2.
(iv) The interior solution, n*, have the following properties:
* * *
0, 0, 0
λ
∂ ∂ ∂
> < <
∂ ∂ ∂
n n n
F z
The sign of the comparative statics is quite intuitive. When the 
fixed cost is higher, discounts should be offered less frequently. When 
either λ is larger (a discount is more effective in boosting demand) or 
z is larger (a higher demand is more profitable), the firm should offer 
discounts more often.
Dynamic Duopoly Competition
Modification of the model
The analysis so far has dealt with monopoly. Naturally, we would 
like to extend the model to oligopoly, where several firms compete 
by using price discounts. In addition to the depths and frequencies 
of discounts, the timing becomes a central issue: do the firms offer 
discounts at the same time? I focus on duopoly. To accommodate the 
interaction between firms, I modify the model as follows.
Two firms, designated a and b, sell differentiated products. The 
demand of firm i in period t is ( )µ= −i i it t tq x p  where i = a, b, and itp  
and itx  are the price and demand coefficient of firm i in period t. The 
interaction between the two firms is assumed to affect only the demand 
coefficient:
1δ λ θ−= + −
i i i j
t t t tx x d d                  (7)
where 0 < δ < 1, λ > θ ≥ 0, j = {a, b}\ i, and itd  is firm i’s depth of 
discount in period t. As in the model for monopoly, itd > 0 if firm i 
offers a discount in period t, and itd = 0 if the normal price is charged. 
Time Time
d
db
xa
xb
x
da
Figure 3: Firm b overshoots when firm a’s starting demand is very high and firm 
b’s is very low.
15This conclusion is sensitive to the specification of the model. For example, if xt drops asymptotically to a level, x0, that is greater than zero (see footnote 5), then d  will 
depend on λ.
16This argument is similar to that of the cash-in-advance model, where an individual must balance the cost of fore gone interest on the one hand, which is a variable cost, 
and the cost of making a trip to the bank on the other hand, which is a fixed cost.  
( )
( )
( )( )
53
332
11 2( )
11 3 21
λ
δ δ
 
+ ∏ = − 
−− + − 
sz sF
ss s
s                 (6)
For fixed β and δ, choosing n is equivalent to choosing s ∈ (0, 1). 
Intuitively, the fixed cost, F, should play a crucial role in determining 
the optimal frequency of the discount. As shown previously, the optimal 
depth of the discount is positive when F is not taken into account: the 
seller should offer the discount whenever she has a chance16. At the 
other extreme, when F is extremely high, the firm may never want any 
discount. When F takes a moderate value, there should be an interior 
solution of n.
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Compared to the monopoly case, there is now a new parameter, θ, that 
captures the interaction between the two firms. When θ > 0, a firm’s 
discount boosts consumer memory for its own product but hurts the 
memory for its rival’s product. When θ = 0, the two firms become two 
independent monopolists.
Expression (7) says that, if neither of the firms offers any discount, 
the demand for each firm shrinks at a constant rate, δ, but the lost 
consumers do not go to the firm’s competitor. When a firm offers a 
discount, the demands of both firms are affected: the discounting 
firm’s own demand is raised by a factor λ, while its rival’s demand 
is reduced by a factor θ. The rival’s demand is affected because some 
of its customers are lured away by the discount17. Finally, when both 
firms offer discounts at the same time, the net effect will depend on 
the magnitude of the two discounts. Because λ > θ, if the two discounts 
have the same depth, demands of both firms are boosted.
Since the interaction between the two firms only affects the 
demand coefficients, as in the case of monopoly, the normal prices 
should always be fixed at pm = (μ + c)/2 for each firm, and the profit 
of a normal period is ( )( ) 2π µ= − − =i i i i it t t t tx p p c x z , where, again z = 
(μ − c)/2 is the profit margin.
Under duopoly competition, I am primarily interested in the 
equilibrium timing of discounts, i.e., whether the two firms synchronize 
their offerings of discounts. This question is meaningful only when the 
frequency of discounting is the same for the two firms. As such, let 
us assume that both firms offer discounts once every n periods, which 
form a cycle. The game is played in two stages. In the first stage, the two 
firms announce simultaneously the timing of their discounts in each 
cycle. Given the fixed timing, in the second stage, the two firms choose 
the depths of discounts cycle by cycle.
Second stage: The dynamic duopoly system with fixed timing
As usual, the equilibrium is solved by backward induction, starting 
from the second stage. In the second stage, the firms’ discounts may be 
simultaneous or non-simultaneous. Let us look at the two situations 
in turn.
Simultaneous timing: Without loss of generality, let the 
simultaneous timing occur at the beginning of each cycle. Suppose that 
the demand coefficients at the beginning of a cycle are xa and xb for the 
two firms and that the depths of the discounts are da and db. Then, the 
two firms’ profits from that cycle are:
 ( )( )2π λ θ= + − −a a a b ax d d y d ; ( )( )2π λ θ= + − −b b b a bx d d y d
where, again, ( )
2 1
1
β δ
βδ
−
=
−
n nz
y . Given db, firm a chooses da to maximize 
its own lifetime profits. Likewise for firm b. The duopoly dynamic 
programming problem is thus set up as:
( ) ( ){ }0, max ,π β≥= +a na b d a a bV x x V g g                 (8)
( ){ }0( , ) max ,π β≥= +b na b d b a bU x x U g g                 (9)
There are two state variables, xa and xb, and a choice variable for 
each firm. The transition equations of the system are given by:
( )δ λ θ= + −na a a bg x d d , and  ( )δ λ θ= + −
n
b b b ag x d d
The best response function for each firm is found by dynamic 
programming18.
Lemma 1: In the subgame with simultaneous timing, the depths of 
discounts in each cycle are characterized by
1                                   6 1                                   61                                   6
da
db
k k k
xa
xb
Π b
Π a
Figure 4: Steady state variables with different timing.
Table 3: Steady state profits for various timing combinations.
ka\kb 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 926, 926 802, 944 842, 922 879, 906 913, 898 945, 896
2 944, 802 944, 944 816, 968 852, 951 886, 942 916, 939
3 922, 842 968, 816 963, 963 833, 994 865, 983 895, 980
4 906, 879 951, 852 994, 833 985, 985 851, 1022 880, 1018
5 898, 913 942, 886 983, 865 1022, 851 1010,1010 872, 1053
6 896, 945 939, 916 980, 895 1018, 880 1053, 872 1038,1038
17Basically, consumers evaluate the relative attractiveness of the two products when at least one firm is offering a discount. This is similar in spirit to the demand pattern of 
Rosenthal [57]: consumers start to compare the two products only when one firm raises its price. In my model, the interaction between the two firms is not through price or 
quantity (i.e., it is not Bertrand or Cournot), but rather through price reductions. There is implicitly an optimization problem that consumers solve, and expression (7) can be 
viewed as a reduced form of the demand due to consumers’ choices.
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2
2
2 2 0,
2 2 0,
λϕ θη ρ λ
λϕ θη ρ λ
 + − + =

+ − + =
a a b a a
b a b b b
d d d x d y
d d d x d y
where ρ = 1− βnδ2n, ϕ = 2βnδn +2βnδ2n − 3, and η = 1− βnδn − βnδ2n.
If the two firms’ businesses are equally good (i.e., xa = xb = x), their 
discounts are of the same magnitude. Moreover, the common choice, d 
(= *ad =
*
bd ), have the following properties:
0, 0, 0, 0,
δ β
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
< > > >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
d d d d
x z
while
0
θ
∂
>
∂
d if and only if  2 1β δ β δ+ <n n n n
These signs are quite intuitive and are also consistent with the 
corresponding signs under monopoly. There is a new parameter, 
θ, under duopoly. For a large range of parameters, the depth of the 
discount, d, increases in θ. That is, if a firm’s customers are sensitive to 
the rival product’s discounts, the firm should discount deeply so as to 
win back the leaving customers19.
Numerical examples show that starting from any pair of xa and 
xb, the dynamic system converges to a unique steady state. The path 
of the convergence, however, is not necessarily monotonic. If xa and 
xb differ very much, the firm that starts with a lower demand may 
overshoot in terms of both the choice variable, d, and the state variable, 
x, before finally settling down at the steady state. Figure 3 illustrates 
this overshooting behavior. In this example, the parameter values are 
the same as in monopoly: λ = 1, z = 5, δ = β = 0.95, n = 6, with a new 
parameter, θ = 0.5. The steady state is found to be ax = bx = 9.11 and 
ad = bd = 6.56. Firm a starts from 0ax = 100 while firm b starts from 
0
bx = 0.
The overshooting can be understood as follows. Due to its original 
high demand, firm a’s discount is first very small and then eventually 
rises. In principle, firm b should do just the opposite: decrease the depths 
of its discounts over time. Under duopoly competition, however, there 
is interaction between the two firms. In the first several cycles, because 
firm a’s discounts are small, there is not much interaction, so firm b 
continues to decrease its discounts. Later, the interaction becomes 
stronger, which requires da and db to move in the same direction, so 
the discount depths both go up. This gives rise to firm b’s overshooting 
behavior.
Proposition 5: In the subgame with simultaneous timing, starting 
from any pair of xa and xb, the dynamic system converges to a unique 
steady state in which
( )
1
δ λ θ λ
σδ
−
= = =
−
n
a b
n
yx x x  and  
( )1λ δ
σ
−
= = =
n
a b
y
d d d
where  ( ) ( )3 2 2 1σ λ δ β δ θ β δ= − − − −n n n n n
When the two firms start from different demand levels, the firm 
with the higher demand will choose a smaller discount, leading to a 
smaller difference between the two firms’ demands in the next cycle. 
Eventually they converge to the same level.
Non-simultaneous timing
Now consider the case when the two firms offer discounts at 
different times. Without loss of generality, let firm a discount in the first 
period of each cycle and firm b in the k th period, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. Following 
the same procedure as in the simultaneous timing case, it can be shown 
that the equilibrium depths of discounts, da and db, are characterized by 
the following two best response functions:20
2 2 12 2 0λϕ θβ δ ρ λ− +− − + =n n ka a b a ad d d x d y                  (10)
2 1 12 2 0λϕ θηδ δ ρ λ− −+ − + =k kb a b b bd d d x d y                 (11)
where φ, ρ and η are defined in Lemma 1.
Numerical examples show that, for every timing arrangement, the 
duopoly dynamic system is globally stable and converges to a unique 
steady state. Figure 4 shows the two firms’ steady state discounts, 
demands in the discount period, and per-cycle profits. Remember that 
k is the timing of firm b’s discount and that firm a’s discount is in the 
first period.
Lemma 2: In the subgame with non-simultaneous timing,
(i) The depths of discounts ad  and bd  are characterized by
( ) ( ) ( )2 13 2 2 1 1 0λ δ β δ θδ β δ λ δ− +− − − − − − =n n n n k n n na a bd d d y                (12)
( ) ( ) ( )2 13 2 2 1 1 0λ δ β δ θδ β δ λ δ−− − − − − − =n n n k n n nb a bd d d y                  (13)
(ii) If 1
2
>
+
<
nk , then .
>
<a b
d d
In order to understand conclusion (ii), consider the case when 
k  1
2
< +
n . That is, firm a’s discount is followed quickly by firm b’s. 
Because firm a can only enjoy the increased demand for a very short 
time, its incentive for offering discounts is reduced. As a result, a’s 
discount should be smaller than b’s. The symmetry in conclusion (ii) 
(and in Figure 4) around k = 1
2
+
n  should come as no surprise. After 
all, a cycle is defined arbitrarily in the dynamic process with an infinite 
time horizon. When k > 1
2
+
n , firm b’s discount is closer to firm a’s 
next discount than to the current one. Consequently, the starting and 
ending points of a cycle can be redefined so that firm b’s discount comes 
first in a cycle, while firm a’s discount follows in the (n−k)th period. 
The conclusion of (ii) can therefore be restated as follows: define the 
18The Folk Theorem is not applicable here, as it is not a stage game. We can view the equilibrium as a Markov equilibrium because the strategy depends only on the state 
of the world when an action is taken.  
19Notice that θ affects d through the demand coefficient x, not through parameter λ. Some people may think that since 1δ λ θ−= + −
i i i j
t t t tx x d d  given =
i j
t td d , the demand 
becomes ( )1δ λ θ−= + −i it t tx x d , so the presence of θ has the effect of reducing the discount coefficient, λ. Furthermore, since d increases in λ, it should in turn decrease in θ. 
This argument is wrong, as =i jt td d  cannot be assumed a priori. When determining the optimal da, firm a should regard db as given. Consequently, ( )1δ θ λ−= − +i i j it t b tx x d d . The 
presence of θ serves to reduce itx , and we know that d decreases in x.
20One might raise the issue of sub game perfection. For fixed k, the timing of actions seems to be well defined: in each cycle, firm a moves first and firm b moves second. 
In principle, when choosing its own optimal depth of discount, firm a should anticipate what firm b’s response is in the future. With dynamic interaction, however, each firm 
makes its choice repeatedly. There is no well-defined leader follower relationship when we look beyond one cycle. Therefore, we regard it as a simultaneous-move game: 
each firm announces its choice of discounts simultaneously at the beginning of each cycle and commits to the discount in that cycle.   
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“leader” to be the firm whose discount is closer to the other firm’s next 
discount than to its previous discount. Then the steady state discount 
of the leader is smaller than that of the follower.
First stage: Equilibrium timing of discounts
Having derived the steady state profits with various timing 
arrangements, we are now ready to determine the equilibrium timing 
of discounts. An analytical solution for non-simultaneous timing is too 
complicated, so I resort to numerical simulation using the parameter 
values that have been used throughout the paper: λ = 1, θ = 0.5, z = 5, δ 
= β = 0.95, n = 6. Steady state profits of the two firms are calculated for 
every combination of the timing and the following table is constructed:21 
This symmetric table has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, 
in which both firms offer discounts in the last period of each cycle. 
Therefore, we draw the following conclusion: 
In the dynamic duopoly game, in equilibrium the two firms offer 
discounts at the same time.
The last graph in Figure 4 reveals that when ka = 1, firm b’s profit is 
maximized at *bk = 2: the best response is to offer discounts immediately 
after its rival does. By doing so, a firm can enjoy the boosted demand 
for the longest time before its rival’s next discount. This is true as long 
as there is a “later” period in the cycle: When ka = 2, 3, 4, 5, 
*
bk = ka + 1 
(see Table 3). When the rival’s discount appears in the last period (ka 
= 6), however, there is no period in the same cycle that is later, so firm 
b’s best choice is to offer a discount in the same (last) period. Since the 
timing game is symmetric, the above best response leads to a unique 
equilibrium, in which the two firms offer discounts simultaneously.
In principle, the timing game could also have mixed strategy 
equilibrium, but two forces make it unlikely. First, the purpose of 
offering discounts is to remind consumers of the existence of the 
products. Regularity of the discount timing is therefore important. 
This is different from the incentive of price discrimination, for which 
unpredictability is a crucial element and consequently randomized 
strategies fit perfectly. Second, the two firms have a collective incentive 
to coordinate the timing, as their total profit of ka = kb = 6 is the highest 
among all combinations of the timing and therefore is higher than 
any weighted average of the payoffs in Table 3. Given the symmetry 
between the two firms, this means that the pure strategy equilibrium of 
simultaneous timing Pareto dominates any mixed strategy equilibrium. 
As long as one firm is able to announce its choice of timing before the 
other firm does, which is very likely in reality, the coordination can be 
easily achieved.
In fact, this second force also gives us a hint as to what will 
happen when the two firms choose different n, which is the frequency 
of discounts. Then their discounts will necessarily be staggered; 
sometimes a’s discount precedes b’s, and sometimes b’s precedes a’s. 
As we have seen, a firm’s discount becomes rather ineffective when 
followed quickly by its rival’s. Over time, the firm’s profits fluctuate, 
but overall, both firms should do worse than when they synchronize 
their discounts. This gives them strong incentive to choose the same 
frequency and then coordinate the timing.
Having established simultaneous timing as the only equilibrium 
in the duopoly dynamic game, we can now study the properties 
of the equilibrium. Proposition 5 characterizes the steady state of 
simultaneous timing. We are mainly interested in a comparison 
between monopoly and duopoly, which is reflected in the presence of 
parameter θ. We have:
Proposition 6: In the duopoly steady state, d  increases in θ and 
x decreases in θ.
Parameter θ measures the interaction between the two firms. When 
θ is larger, the negative impact of one firm’s discount on the other 
firm’s demand is larger, so the equilibrium demand level for both firms 
is lower. Facing lower demands, therefore, each firm needs to offer 
deeper discounts to compete for consumers. 
Since θ = 0 represents the case of monopoly, the above Proposition 
leads to: 
Corollary: Compared with monopoly, the duopoly demand is 
lower, while the discount is deeper.
Conclusion
This paper provides a new explanation for why price discounts are 
offered. I suggest that the demand for a firm’s product shrinks over 
time and that the firm periodically uses price discounts to boost the 
diminishing demand. While it is well known that demand can be 
stimulated by advertising, the paper’s contribution is to show that price 
reductions can be regarded as a special form of advertising. For a widely 
used business practice such as price discounts, there are naturally many 
different explanations. For example, the periodic price reduction in 
durable goods is explained well by Conlisk et al. [11] and Sobel [12], 
while consumers’ stockpiling behavior for storable goods is modeled 
by Pesendorfer [13]. I have focused in this paper on non-durable, non-
storable products such as fast foods and services, because these are the 
places where the existing literature is not able to provide a satisfactory 
theory22. The model works well to explain all of the stylized facts. It also 
provides some insight into the interaction between firms in a dynamic 
setup when price discounts are the choice variables.
Notice that the model itself does not need the assumption of a non-
durable, non storable good; the basic idea is applicable to any industry. 
The model’s prediction of the optimal pricing pattern has actually 
21They are steady state profits in each cycle. Lifetime profits are these figures multiplied by 
1
1 β− n . Also, the profits are gross of the fixed cost, F, (more precisely, firm i’s profit 
is gross of 1β −ik F , where ki is the period in which firm i offers its discounts). If the fixed cost is included in the payoffs, the equilibrium of ka = kb = 6 is still valid, as offering 
discounts as late as possible in a cycle becomes even more attractive. On the other hand, when F is included, there may arise an equilibrium with non- simultaneous timing, 
but only when the timing of the two firms’ discounts differ by exactly half the length of the cycle, e.g., ka = 1 and kb = 4. For this to be an equilibrium, given ka = 1, πb(kb = 4) 
= 906−β3F needs to be the largest among firm b’s profits with other choices of timing. It can be shown that under very mild conditions (say, 1
2
β ≥ ), this will never be true.
22Foods are mostly perishable within a very short time, so the concern for inventory or storage should not be the primary reason for price discounts as long as the demand 
is stable and predictable. There may be clearance sales before expiry dates, but that is different from the hi-lo pricing studied in this paper–A discounted burger is as fresh 
as the ones sold at regular prices (on other days). Besides, selling expiring items at discounted price may run the risk of cannibalization: If the sales are predictable, some 
people may wait for the sales (admittedly they obtain a lower quality product), which reduces the demand at the regular price. To deal with cannibalization, sellers may com-
mit to not offering any sales for expiring foods. For example, mooncakes are sold once a year in Asian countries before the Mid-Autumn Festival, after which the demand 
will drop sharply. There is clearly an incentive for retailers to get rid of the unsold mooncakes by selling them at discounted prices. And yet no merchant offers mooncakes 
for sales after the holiday. They destroy the unsold mooncakes, donate them to charities, or ship them to another country.
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been found in many other industries: periodic price reductions with 
a long period of a constant high price and a short period of a constant 
low price for durable goods [1] and non-durable but storable goods 
[13], as well as simultaneous offerings of price discounts by competing 
firms [19,58]. On the other hand, it is fully possible that several forces 
could all play a role in generating the pricing pattern of a particular 
industry. For example, while my model can explain why Burger King 
offers deep discounts once a week, it does not exclude the element of 
price discrimination, and the exact timing of discounts may well reflect 
a concern for peak-load pricing23. If that is the case, which theory is 
more appealing becomes an empirical question. Pashigian [59] and 
Pashigian and Bowen [60] have done valuable work in this direction. 
Although I propose that periodic price reduction is a special 
form of advertising, there are important differences between the two 
promotion strategies. Price discounts have the danger of delivering 
an image of inferior quality, so this strategy should not be utilized in 
cases when quality is a major concern (new products, fashion clothing, 
or industries with important vertical product differentiation). The 
fast food industry is a good place to execute the discounting strategy 
because the product quality is standard and well known. Consumers 
have long perceived that $2.99 is the normal price for a burger at Burger 
King, so discounting the price to $0.99, while stimulating the demand, 
will not damage the product image.
Another drawback of price discounts is that competitors are likely 
to respond with their own price cuts, making the first firm’s discounting 
less effective or even counter-productive. By contrast, advertising has 
the strategic effect of reducing price competition: When I promote my 
products with advertising, my customers are less likely to switch to 
your product. This will make your price cut less effective in luring my 
customers, so you will cut the price less often or may even raise your 
own prices, which in turn benefits me.
Of course promotional strategies do not have to be used exclusively. 
Many discounts in the real world are accompanied by heavy advertising. 
On the other hand, we do see various advertisements without price 
discounts. It will be interesting to study under what situation a firm 
should use advertising and under what situation the firm should use 
price discounts with advertising. Milgrom and Roberts [18] have 
analyzed the optimal combination of discounting and advertising for 
quality signaling. Discounting without advertising is also imaginable–
for effective price discrimination.
Other promotional strategies such as public relations, personal 
selling, direct marketing or sponsorship may also boost consumers’ 
memory. But price discount may also serve the purpose of second-
degree price discrimination [61]: Price-sensitive consumers are more 
likely to notice the regular price discounts and end up purchasing the 
product at the lower price, exactly what price discrimination requires. 
While direct marketing may target particular segments, discrimination 
is achieved only after the target has been identified first. The beauty of 
second-degree (i.e., indirect) price discrimination is that the seller does 
not need to identify or differentiate consumers–consumers differentiate 
themselves by self-selecting into different pricing deals. Although not 
modeled in this paper, price discrimination is likely to be a goal by 
store managers in real life when they choose marketing strategies, and 
price discounts have the advantage of achieving memory stimulation 
and price discrimination simultaneously.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
If a normal price, pt, should deviate from the single-period optimal 
level, pm, the concern must be the indirect effect. I distinguish between 
two cases: pnnt  (the next period price is also normal) and p
nd
t  (the next 
period price is discounted). When pt = p
nn
t , the indirect effect is zero, 
so in equilibrium  pnnt = pm for every t.
As for ndtp , if  ndtp = pm for every t, the proof is finished. Suppose that 
in an equilibrium, ≠ndt mp p  for at least one t. Because pr is the weighted 
average of every ndtp  and many 
nn
tp , we have mint{ ndtp } < pr < maxt{nk
tp }. Let j  {arg mint{
nd
tp }} and k  {arg maxt{ ndtp }}.
If pr ≥ pm, then  
nd
kp > pr ≥ pm. Then, the monopolist can earn a 
higher profit by slightly lowering ndkp , because rk+1 = min{pr, 
nd
jp } = 
pr is not affected by 
nd
kp , and the profit in period k is decreasing in ndkp  
when ndkp  > pm.
If pr < pm, then 
nd
jp  < pr < pm. Then rj+1 = min{pr, 
nd
jp } = ndjp . The 
profit in period j is increasing in ndjp  when ndjp < pm. The profit in the 
next period, πj+1 = qj+1(pj+1 − c) − F = (δxj + λdj+1)(μ − pj+1)(pj+1 − c) − F, 
is increasing in pj+1 for fixed dj+1 > 0, as pj+1 = 
nd
jp  − dj+1 < ndjp  < pm. But 
pj+1 = 
nd
jp  − dt+1 increases in ndjp , so in turn πj+1 also increases in 
nd
jp
. Therefore the firm could have enjoyed a higher profit in both period 
j and period (j+1) by slightly increasing ndjp , while the profits in all the 
following periods are either not affected (when period (j+2) is a normal 
period) or positively affected (when period (j+2) is a discount period), 
as the reference price in period (j+2), rj+2 = pj+1, is higher, while the 
demand coefficient, xj+2 = δxj+1 + λdj+2 = δ2xj + δλdj+1 + λdj+2, is the same 
when dj+1 and dj+2 are both fixed. 
In summary, ndjp  must equal to pm for every t in any equilibrium. 
Combined with the fact that nntp  = pm for every t, this leads to the 
conclusion that all normal prices are the same. Moreover, they are all 
equal to pm. As a result, pr = pm.
B Proof of Proposition 2
In the dynamic programming problem (3), let g = δnx + δλd. Then, 
the first-order condition with respect to the choice variable, d, gives:
( ) ( )1 2 2 2 1 '2 2 0β λ λ δ β λδ− − − − − + = n n nz d d xd V g                 (14)
The envelope equation associated with the state variable, x, leads to:
( ) ( )' 1 1 2 'β δ β δ− −= − +n n n nV x y d V g                (15)
From (14), solve for the expression of ( )'V g , which is then plugged 
into (15) to get:
Now, use variable g = δnx + δλd as a substitute for x in equation 
(16) to get the derivative of the value function evaluated at g:
( ) ( )
1
' 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
2
3
δ δ δλ
β δ β δ
λ
−
− − − −
 +
 = − + − +
 
 
n n
n n n n
x d d
V g y d d z
                  (17)
23The discounts on Tuesdays by Hong Kong movie theatres may be partly explained by the fact that many people go to horse racing on Wednesdays while new movies 
are always released on Thursdays.
( )
1
1 1 2 1 1 2 2' 23 δβ δ β δ
λ
−
− − − −  = − + − + 
 
n
n n n n xdV x y d d z   (16)
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Plug (17) into (14) to get
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 1 22 2 3 2 1 0λ β δ β δ δ β δ λ−= + − − − + =n n n n n n nH d d x d y   (18)
Using φ and φ specified in the proposition, (18) becomes
( ) 2 2 0λϕ φ λ= − + =H d d x d y                (19)
Notice that λ, x, φ, y > 0, but φ could be either positive or negative. 
Out of the two solutions of d in equation (19), only the one given in the 
proposition is optimal. 
One can easily verify that d* > 0. When x2 ≥ (φλ2y)/φ2, the term 
within the square root is non-negative so that d* is well defined. 
Otherwise, H(d) is positive for every d, and d should take the highest 
possible value, namely pm.
For the requirement that d* ≤ pm, observe that d* depends on 
z, which is (μ − c)/2, while pm = (μ+c)/2. For any pm, z can be made 
arbitrarily small so that d* will be close to zero and d* ≤ pm will always 
be satisfied.
C Proof of Proposition 3
In any steady state, x = g(x, d(x)) = δnx + δλd. Therefore,
1
λδ
δ
=
− n
dx                  (20)
By plugging (20) into the expression H(d) = 0 in equation (18), the 
steady states x and d  can be found as shown in the Proposition. Notice 
that d depends only on z = (μ − c)/2 and therefore is independent of 
the requirement d  ≤ pm = (μ + c)/2. For simplicity, let us ignore the 
unlikely case where d > pm.
Recall from Proposition 2 that in order for d = d*, x2 must be no 
less than (φλ2y)/ φ2. It turns out that this requirement is always satisfied 
at x = x :
( )
( )( )
232 22
2 2
3 2 2
0
1 3 2
β δ δ β δϕλ λ
φ φ δ δ β δ
+ − −
− = ≥
− − −
n n n n n
n n n n
y yx
Expression H(d) = 0 of equation (19) fully characterizes the optimal 
choice of d*. There is a one-for-one mapping between the state variable, 
x, and the choice variable, d*. From H(d*) = 0,
x can be expressed as a function of d*:
( )* * *2
λ ϕ
φ
 = + 
 
yx d d
d
Consequently, the state variable of the next cycle, g, can also be 
expressed as a function of the choice variable, d*, in the current cycle:
( )* * * **2
λδδ δλ ϕ δλ
φ
 = + = + + 
 
n
n yg d x d d d
d
From the discussion of comparative statics, we know that d* 
decreases in x: 'x  (d*) < 0. Thus,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' * ' * ' * ' *δ δλ δ= + > >n ng d x d x d x d
At ( x ,d ), the slope of g(d*) is negative:
( )' 22
λδ ϕ δλ
φ
 
= − + 
 
n yg d
d
( )( )2 1
0
1
δ β δλδ
φ δ
− −
= − <
−
n n nn
n
The two curves, x(d*) and g(d*), cross each other at ( x ,d ), at 
which point the slopes of both curves are negative.
d* is monotonically decreasing in x. Corresponding to x = 0, there 
is a maximum ( )ϕ= = −md d y . In general g(d*) is U-shaped. g(d*) 
achieves its maximum slope at dm:
( )' 22
λδ ϕ δλ
φ
 
= − + 
 
n
m
m
yg d
d
λδ ϕ δλ
φ
= +
n  ( )22 2λδ β δ β δ
φ
= + −
n
n n n n
The slope ( )' mg d  could be either positive or negative. However, 
g(dm) is never greater than x :
( ) δ δλ= +nm mg d x d
λδ= md (because d=dm implies x=0)
( )λδ ϕ= − y
.
1
γλδ
δ
≤ =
− n
z x
The dynamics of the system are represented by the transition 
from x(d*) to g(d*). The two variables are brought together by d* as 
a linkage. Figure 2 shows the only two possible cases of the dynamic 
system: ( )' mg d < 0 and  ( )' mg d > 0.
(1) ( )' mg d < 0. Both x(d) and g(d) are monotonically decreasing 
in d, and x(d) has a steeper slope than g(d) for any valid d. Starting 
from an arbitrary x1, the firm chooses d1, which is found on curve x(d). 
Then corresponding to the same d1, g1 is found from the g(d) curve. The 
transition is a mapping from x1 to g1. In the next round g1 becomes x2 
and the whole process repeats itself. It is clear from the picture that the 
system converges monotonically to ( x ,d ).
(2) ( )' mg d > 0. Starting from any x, the system again converges 
monotonically to ( x ,d ).
D Proof of Proposition 4
The objective function is given in equation (6), and the choice 
variable is s. The first-order condition is
With G and u(s) defined as in the proposition, the above equation 
becomes F = Gu(s*). 'u (s) is always negative for any s ∈ (0, 1), so the 
second-order condition is always satisfied.
Figure 5 shows u as a function of s. It is clear from the picture 
that the optimal s (and thus the optimal n) is found at the intersection 
of u(s) and ( )
3
2 2
3 12
δ
λ
= −
F F
G z
. When F/G > 2 3
9
 = 0.385, there is no 
intersection  ⇔ δn* = s* = 0 ⇔  n* = ∞. The fact that n ≥ 2 (remember 
that discounts are never offered in consecutive periods) leads to the 
other boundary result in (iii).
Since n* decreases in s*, it is straightforward to verify the 
comparative statics from the picture.
E Proof of Lemma 1
Regarding equation (8), for firm a, there is a first-order condition 
with respect to the choice variable da:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 , ,λ λ θ β δ λ δ θ ∂ ∂− − + − + − ∂ ∂ 
n n n
a a a b a a b a b
a b
V Vy d x d d d g g g g
x x
                     (21)
There are two envelope equations, corresponding to the two state 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
33
2
3 5 232
' 12 6 0
1 3 2 11
λ
δ
+
∏ = − − =
− + −−
sz Fs
s s s
s
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variables:
( ) ( ) ( )2, ,β δ∂ ∂= − +
∂ ∂
n n
a b a a b
a a
V Vx x y d g g
x x                (22)
( ) ( ), ,β δ∂ ∂=
∂ ∂
n n
a b a b
b b
V Vx x g g
x x                 (23)
From equations (22) and (23), express the two partial derivatives 
evaluated at (ga, gb) in terms of those evaluated at (xa, xb), and plug the 
results into equation (21),
( ) ( ) 2, , 2 2 2λ θ λ θ∂ ∂− = + −
∂ ∂a b a b a a a a ba b
V Vx x x x d x d d d
x x                 (24)
Using ga to substitute for xa in the right-hand side of the above 
equation, we get the left-hand side expression evaluated at (ga, gb):
( ) ( ) ( )2, , 2 2 2∂ ∂− = + + − −
∂ ∂
n
a b a b a a a a b a b
a b
V Vg g g g d d x d d d d
x x
λ θ λ δ λ θ θ
                    (25)
Plug (25) into equation (21), and the best response function for 
firm a emerges as an implicit function of da and db:
( ) ( )2 2 23 2 2 2 1λ β δ β δ θ β δ β δ− + + + − −n n n n n n n nad
   ( )22 1 0β δ λ− − + =n na b a ad d x d y             (26)
which is the expression in the Lemma.
When xa is switched with xb in equation (26), and at the same time 
da is switched with db, firm b’s best response function will emerge as:
( ) ( )2 2 23 2 2 2 1λ β δ β δ θ β δ β δ− + + + − −n n n n n n n nbd  
   ( )22 1 0β δ λ− − + =n na b b bd d x d y   (27)
F Proof of Proposition 5
The steady state should be characterized by four equations: the two 
best response equations, (26) and (27), and two steady state transition 
equations:
( )δ λ θ= + − =a a a b ag x d d x ; ( )δ λ θ= + − =bb b a bg x d d x    (28)
From (28), we solve
( )
1
δ λ θ
δ
−
=
−
n
a b
a n
d d
x  and 
( )
1
δ λ θ
δ
−
=
−
n
b a
b n
d d
x                (29)
Take the difference between equations (26) and (27) and plug in 
(29). We have:
( ) ( )2 23 2 01
λ δ β δ
δ
− −
− =
−
n n n
a bn d d                  (30)
thus ad = bx . Consequently ax  = bx . Drop the subscript. Plugging (29) 
into either (26) or (27), we get the steady state discount and demand in 
the Proposition. Notice that the denominator in the expression
( ) ( )3 2 2 1σ λ δ β δ θ β δ= − − − −n n n n n
( ) ( )3 2 2 1λ δ β δ λ β δ> − − − −n n n n n
( )1 0λ δ= − >n
so that the expression is well defined.
G Proof of Lemma 2
In the steady state, the demand coefficient for firm a at the beginning 
of the next cycle, ga = δn(xa + λda) − θδn−k+1db, should equal to that of the 
previous cycle, xa. From this equation, we can solve
1
1
λδ θδ
δ
− +−
=
−
n n k
a b
a n
d dx                   (31)
Similarly,
1
1
λδ θδ
δ
− + −
=
−
n k n
b a
b n
d dx                   (32)
These two expressions are then plugged into equations (10) and 
(11) to get the expressions in the Lemma.
Taking the difference between the two equations (12) and (13), we 
find that 
2 2
−a bd d  has the
same sign as δn−k+1 − δk−1. When, k = 1
2
+
n  δn−k+1 = δk−1 so x  = bd . 
When k   12 +
n
δn−k+1   δk−1 so ad    bd .
H Proof of Proposition 6
We know by direct observation that d  increases in θ.
( ) ( ) ( )3
2 1
1
λδ λ δ β δ θ β δ
θ σ δ
∂  = + − + − ∂ −
n n n n n n
n
x y
But ( ) ( )2 1λ δ β δ θ β δ+ − + −n n n n n
  ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 0λ δ β δ λ β δ λ δ< + − + − = − <n n n n n n
Therefore, x  decreases in θ.
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